• Five leaks of extremely flammable hydrocarbons occurred at Fife Ethylene Plant between February 2018 and September 2019 – including one which lasted four months
• The leaks were discovered after Health & Safety Executive inspectors detected strong smell of flammable gas on a routine inspection –  all five leaks were attributed to Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI)
• An investigation by the Health and Safety Executive concluded that the company did not have adequate arrangements for inspection of insulated pipework.

ExxonMobil Chemical Limited has been fined £267,000 after health and safety inspectors found corroded pipes had resulted in five leaks of flammable gas at its Fife Ethylene Plant.

An investigation by Health & Safety Executive (HSE) inspectors found the company’s arrangements for inspection of insulated pipework were not adequate and resulted in five known leaks of extremely flammable hydrocarbons at the natural gas processing plant operated by the company at Mossmorran, near Kirkcaldy.

The plant was an Upper Tier COMAH [Control of Major Accident Hazards] establishment as defined by the 2015 COMAH Regulations, due to the volume of hazardous substances on site and the risk to people and the environment they presented. This means it was subject to the strictest controls because of the potential for catastrophic consequences of health and safety failings.

How the leaks were discovered

On 21 May 2019, Health and Safety Executive (HSE) inspectors visited the site for a routine inspection. They noticed a strong smell of Dimethyl Sulphide (DMS), a highly flammable liquid that irritates eyes and skin and is harmful if swallowed. An operator confirmed that DMS and ethane were leaking from an overhead pipe, and that the company had known about the leak for around four months but had kept operating without taking extra precautions.

HSE launched an investigation. This revealed that the leak was not a one-off. There had been an earlier leak on the same pipe in February 2018, and another on a different pipe elsewhere on site in December 2018, both caused by Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI). As the investigation progressed, two more leaks were discovered, meaning five leaks in total, all caused by CUI. The investigation broadened to examine how the company managed CUI risk across the site.

The five leaks

23 February 2018: A pinhole leak of DMS and ethane developed on a 2-inch steel pipe (the “DMS line”), which was under high pressure and running at 115 degrees Celsius. The leak went on for around four months before being fixed.

15 December 2018: A leak of ethane gas was spotted by chance on a different pipe (the “ST01 Overheads line”) when a worker noticed a haze coming through the insulation while doing unrelated work. Corroded cladding had let four small holes form. The leak lasted around six weeks and an estimated 82 tonnes of hydrocarbons escaped into the atmosphere.

21 May 2019: The leak that triggered HSE’s routine inspection was found on the same DMS line as before, but at a different point. This time the leak was a mix of 20% DMS and 80% ethane. The company had first detected it on 29 January 2019, meaning it had been leaking for about four and a half months. HSE issued a Prohibition Notice on 24 May 2019 banning access to the area, followed by an Improvement Notice on 28 May 2019 ordering repairs. The company fixed the problem on 13 June 2019 by installing a bypass.

26 June 2019: While HSE’s investigation was still underway, a process technician found another pinhole leak, this time on the inlet line to the acetylene converter. X-ray testing showed the pipe had corroded below its safe minimum thickness. The company shut down part of the plant to make repairs, and the leak lasted around two weeks. Unlike the earlier leaks, this time the company acted swiftly rather than continuing to operate without extra safeguards.

September 2019: While carrying out inspections required by HSE’s Improvement Notice, the company found a further pinhole leak on the ST01 Overheads line, close to the site of the December 2018 leak. This was repaired by purging the line and applying an epoxy wrap.

Why this matters

Every leak released highly flammable hydrocarbons into the atmosphere. In all but one case, this happened while the plant was operating normally, with staff and contractors working on site.

Pipes on sites like this are often insulated to stop them freezing. Corrosion Under Insulation happens when water gets in under that insulation and corrodes the pipe underneath. Left unchecked, it weakens pipes until they fail and leak. The industry accepts that CUI can’t be prevented entirely where insulation is needed, but it must be properly monitored and managed to keep the risk under control.

HSE’s investigation found the company’s inspection system was not fit for purpose. Inspectors carried out visual “scoping” checks on each pipe, and the results were fed into a computer tool alongside data on the pipe and its operating conditions. This produced a risk score from 1 (high risk) to 4 (low risk), and the company would only investigate further if a pipe scored 1 or 2.

In practice, these visual inspections were often inadequate. Overhead pipes were typically checked from ground level, sometimes several metres away, with limited visibility, and insulation was not always removed to allow a proper look underneath. Despite suffering repeated leaks caused by CUI, the company did not recognise that its inspection process was flawed until HSE took enforcement action.

Exxonmobil Chemical Limited, of Fawley Administration Building, Fawley Refinery, Marsh Lane, Southampton, pleaded guilty to breaching Regulation 6(2) of The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, and section 33(1)(c) of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. The company was fined £267,000 at Kirkcaldy Sheriff Court on 25 August 2026.

HSE inspector Lindsey Stein said:

“At a site run by one of the biggest energy companies in the world, subject to the strictest controls, and processing high volumes of hazardous material, what our inspectors found beggars belief.

“The failure of ExxonMobil to properly inspect insulated pipework led to five separate leaks of highly flammable hydrocarbons, and while none of these leaks resulted in a catastrophic event, this was down to good fortune rather than good management. The arrangements in place to detect and prevent corrosion were woefully inadequate, and the consequences could have been far more serious.

“Systematic risk management isn’t just best practice, it’s a legal duty, precisely because these are high-hazard operations where the margin for error is minimal. In its simplest terms, process safety is about keeping hazardous substances where they belong: inside the pipes, not in the atmosphere.

“Once we stepped in, the operator was able to identify and fix problems quickly and effectively. That tells you everything you need to know: the measures needed to prevent these leaks were reasonably practicable all along, and they should have been in place long before HSE was forced to intervene.”

Further information:

1. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is Britain’s national regulator for workplace health and safety. We are dedicated to protecting people and places, and helping everyone lead safer and healthier lives.
2. More information about the legislation referred to in this case is available.
3. Further details on the latest HSE news releases is available.
4. HSE does not pass sentences, set guidelines or collect any fines imposed. Relevant sentencing guidelines must be followed unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.  The sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences in Scotland can be found here.

• Colin Thwaites, who had spent his entire career in mining, died working for Lochaline Quartz Sand Limited.
• Lochaline mine is the only underground quartz sand mine in Europe.
• Mr Thwaites was struck by the blades of a fan which wasn’t sufficiently well-guarded

The operator of Europe’s only quartz sand mine has been fined after an experienced electrician was killed after being struck by the blades of a mine BORA fan.

Colin Thwaites, 61, died on 21 October 2024 while working at Lochaline Quartz Sand Limited’s underground mine on the Morvern Peninsula in the Scottish Highlands.

Mr Thwaites, who had spent his entire career in mining and was the mine’s only time-served electrician, had arrived for his day shift to help restore power following damage caused by Storm Ashleigh. He was working alongside an apprentice to disconnect a communications cable near one of the mine’s BORA fans when the incident occurred. His colleague found him trapped in the fan, having suffered fatal injuries.

HSE investigation findings

The Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) Mines and Quarries Unit carried out an investigation, with inspectors arriving at the mine the following day. Their findings identified a series of serious failings in how the fan had been modified, commissioned and maintained.

The fan involved had originally formed part of a single in-line assembly unit with a sister fan. In June 2020, the decision was taken at the mine to split this single unit into two separate fans. HSE investigators found that the hazards arising from this modification had not been properly identified or managed. No written risk assessment was produced, no commissioning documents were created, and no records of any management discussion about the separation could be provided.

Critically, the splitting of the unit left the rotating parts of the Number 2 fan significantly closer to its intake guard than was safe. The fan blades were just 43mm — less than two inches — from the leading edge of the duct. The relevant guarding standard required a distance of at least 200mm, which could have been achieved through appropriate nose cone or cage-type guarding.

To cover the exposed intake, guards were fabricated on-site from two sheets of metal square lattice mesh, which HSE inspectors determined was poorly designed. The metal bracing straps were fitted on the outside of the mesh panels rather than the inside, providing no additional structural strength. The exhaust end of the fan remained entirely unguarded.

When inspectors examined the fan the day after the incident, the intake guard was found to be in a seriously degraded condition. Significant areas of mesh were missing, particularly around the fan’s impeller hub. Wire and mesh pieces recovered from the floor showed heavy corrosion on their broken ends, indicating they had been in that condition for some time — not freshly broken during the incident. Further pieces of mesh had been ejected through the fan during the incident itself. Had the guard been properly designed and maintained, it is likely it would have prevented the fatal incident.

Compounding these failures, the two fans had not been listed on the mine’s Mechanical Asset Register. No inspection checklists or maintenance records for them could be provided. While electrical inspections had been recorded, the degraded condition of the inlet guard had not been identified during those processes.

HSE took immediate and appropriate enforcement action against the company, who then engaged a specialist mining consultancy to achieve compliance.

Lochlaine Quartz Sand Limited, of European Technical Centre, Hall Lane, Lathom, in Ormskirk, Lancashire, pleaded guilty to breaching Section 2(1) and Section 33(1)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. The company was fined £150,000 and told to pay a Victim Surcharge of £11,250 at Inverness Sheriff Court on 16 June 2026.

Kevin Wilson, HSE’s chief inspector of mines and quarries, said:

“This was a tragic and entirely preventable death.

“Colin Thwaites was a highly experienced mining professional with decades of service. He should have gone home to his family that day.

“Our investigation found that when the fan was modified, the risks were not identified. The guarding that was put in place was inadequate from the outset, and its deteriorating condition went unnoticed because there was no proper maintenance regime in place.

“Mine operators have clear legal duties to ensure equipment is safely commissioned and maintained. Where those duties are not met, the consequences can be fatal.”

Further information:

1. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is Britain’s national regulator for workplace health and safety. We are dedicated to protecting people and places, and helping everyone lead safer and healthier lives.
2. More information about the legislation referred to in this case is available.
3. Further details on the latest HSE news releases is available.
4. HSE does not pass sentences, set guidelines or collect any fines imposed. Relevant sentencing guidelines must be followed unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.  The sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences in Scotland can be found here.

• The incident occurred in the early hours of 1 November 2018 at Braefoot Bay Marine Terminal, Firth of Forth, Fife.
• Flammable vapour cloud have resulted in a catastrophic explosion if ignited.
• Vladimir Volkov was treated at hospital and subsequently repatriated to Russia, where he received further treatment. He is understood to have returned to work.

A ship’s engineer suffered serious cold burns after Shell UK’s flawed safety procedures led to  a violent release of liquid propane during loading operations at a Firth of Forth marine terminal, a Health and Safety Executive investigation has found.

Vladimir Volkov, a gas engineer aboard the tanker MV Symi, sustained cold burns to 10–13% of his body surface after liquid propane was released without warning at Shell’s Braefoot Bay Marine Terminal near Dalgety Bay, Fife, in the early hours of 1 November 2018.

The incident created a rapidly expanding flammable vapour cloud that enveloped workers on both the ship’s deck and the adjacent jetty. While the crown agreed the probability of ignition was between 1-2 per cent, the results of such an ignition could have proven catastrophic.

HSE’s investigation was carried out by inspectors and specialists in its Chemical, Explosives, and Microbiological Hazards division – reflecting the large quantities of dangerous substances handled at the site.

How it happened

The release was triggered when a Shell technician accidentally pressed a button on a remote-control handset, causing a loading arm quick release coupling to disconnect from the ship’s manifold before the arm had been fully cleared of propane. An estimated 250–300 kilograms of liquid propane was released at pressure in a matter of seconds.

HSE investigators established that Shell’s own operating procedure — which required a critical safety mechanism known as an emergency release coupling to be disarmed before the arm had been fully purged and drained — directly contradicted the guidance provided by the loading arm manufacturer. It also contradicted procedures prepared by a third party involved in the installation of the equipment.

The failings Shell should have caught

The HSE investigation identified two significant underlying failings.

First, Shell’s system of work was unsafe. The operating procedure in place at the time required workers to disarm the emergency release coupling too early in the disconnect sequence — before the loading arm was fully cleared of product. This left a dangerous window in which an accidental button press could, and did, cause a sudden propane release.

Second, Shell’s management of change process was wholly inadequate. When the company replaced all four of its marine loading arms in 2018 — upgrading to new equipment from a different manufacturer that operated differently, including via wireless remote control and with a quick release coupling — it treated the project as a straightforward “like for like replacement.” It was not.

Shell failed to conduct a full risk assessment of the new loading operation. The new arms introduced a remote-control handset with exposed coupling buttons on its side, a feature that had not existed on the previous equipment. No consideration was given to basic protective measures such as fitting interlocks to prevent the coupling from opening while propane was still present, or simply shrouding the buttons to prevent accidental activation.

Following its own post-incident review — prompted by an Improvement Notice served by HSE — Shell identified that a coupling interlock was both technically feasible and reasonably practicable. That system could have prevented the incident entirely.

The broader risk

The vapour cloud produced by the release extended the full length of the ship and across the jetty, reaching down to the surface of the sea. It was registered by gas detection monitors 20 metres away. Propane vapour is heavier than air, highly flammable, and capable of travelling significant distances to find an ignition source. Had the cloud ignited, those in the immediate vicinity would have faced significant risk to their lives.

Shell UK Limited pleaded guilty to breaching The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015, Regulation 5(1) and the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, Section 33(1)(c). The company was fined £450,000 at Kirkcaldy Sheriff Court on 26 May 2026.

HSE principal specialist inspector Euan Ross said:

“Shell had adapted procedures from its old equipment and applied them to a new and fundamentally different system, without carrying out adequate safety checks.

“While the injuries sustained were serious enough, this could have been a far more catastrophic event.

“We will not hesitate to take action against companies which fail to do all that they should to keep people safe.”

Further information:

1. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is Britain’s national regulator for workplace health and safety. We are dedicated to protecting people and places, and helping everyone lead safer and healthier lives.
2. More information about the legislation referred to in this case is available.
3. Further details on the latest HSE news releases is available.
4. HSE does not pass sentences, set guidelines or collect any fines imposed. Relevant sentencing guidelines must be followed unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.  The sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences in Scotland can be found here.

• HSE investigators uncovered what happened to Jason Thomas, who went missing at 4pm on 22 January 2023.
• Fellow workers on the Valaris 121 offshore rig heard a loud noise and when searching for Mr Thomas found his hard hat, gloves and radio near the airlock door.
• HSE investigation concluded Mr Thomas had plunged into North Sea after falling through a grate which had not been properly secured.

An offshore firm has been handed a £267,000 fine after a long-running HSE investigation found that crewman Jason Thomas was killed when he fell through a missing deck grate and was lost to the North Sea.

Ensco Offshore UK Limited (EO UK Ltd) was responsible for the operation of the Valaris 121 installation when the incident occurred on 22 January 2023.

Jason Thomas, 50, from South Wales, was an experienced offshore worker with around 16 years in the industry. At the time of his death, he was employed by Ensco Services Limited, a wholly owned company of EO UK Ltd, where he had progressed from roustabout to deck foreman and then crane operator.

After he went missing on 22 January 2023, an HM coastguard search was launched and called off the following day, though Jason’s body was never recovered. HSE carried out a full investigation to find out what happened.

HSE’s findings: how the incident unfolded

A thorough investigation by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) found that the grating panel had not been secured in line with the original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM) specifications, and that later inspections had not checked the deployment of Hilti clips, which are used to secure gratings to their substructures and stop them coming loose

On the morning of 22 January, the rig’s hull was afloat and under tow towards Dundee for maintenance. As the day progressed, weather conditions deteriorated significantly, with windspeeds exceeding 30 miles per hour and wave heights well above five metres.

Mr Thomas, who was supervising the deck team during his shift, completed water integrity checks with a colleague at around 2pm. Both men had taken water over their boots during the checks. Mr Thomas was observed removing his coveralls and leaving his hard hat and gloves near the airlock door before changing into training shoes.

At approximately 2.30pm, he was seen taking a break in one of the staff lounges. Around 15 minutes later, a mechanic entered carrying a lifebuoy that had become detached from its holder on the main deck. Mr Thomas told him to leave it in the lounge and that he would ‘deal with it’. He was last seen at around 3.05pm leaving the lounge with a cup of coffee and his mobile phone.

At around 4pm, a colleague in the boot room heard a loud noise from outside. On opening the door to deck 1, he found that the grating immediately outside had been displaced, leaving a void above the waters of the North Sea. The control room was alerted immediately, but repeated tannoy calls failed to locate Mr Thomas. HM Coastguard was eventually contacted several hours later, shortly before 9pm.

During the subsequent search of the rig, Mr Thomas’s hard hat, gloves and radio were found near the airlock door. His coveralls were never recovered. A search and rescue operation was launched under the direction of HM Coastguard but was called off the following day.

Mr Thomas’s mother subsequently obtained a Presumed Death Certificate through the Welsh Courts, confirming that he died on 22 January 2023. She passed away shortly after receiving this confirmation.

The HSE investigation further concluded that wave action over the course of the afternoon had applied sufficient upward force to the grating to cause the fixings to fail and displace it. The possibility of malicious interference was considered but ruled out following examination at HSE’s Buxton scientific facility, where no tool marks were found on the fixings or clips.

Following the incident, the company replaced all polymer grating across its fleet with galvanised steel grating.

Ensco Offshore UK Limited pleaded guilty to breaching Section 3(1) and 33(1)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. At Aberdeen Sheriff’s Court on 18 May 2026, the company was fined £267,000 with an added victim surcharge of £20,025 also imposed taking the total payable to £287,025.

HSE principal inspector Stephen Hanson Hall said:

“This was a profound tragedy which left lasting mark on Jason’s colleagues and his community.

“Jason Thomas was an experienced offshore worker who lost his life in the most unimaginable way possible. The fact his body was never found resulted in great anguish to his mother, who has also since died.

“The investigation was incredibly complex and thorough and we hope it has provided Mr Thomas’ remaining family with some reassurance that we did everything we could to secure them justice.

“Grating systems must be designed, installed and maintained so that they do not present a risk to anyone that may use them, particularly when used in environments where they are susceptible to damage.

“Had the company taken relatively simple measures to identify and control the underlying risks, particularly during the rig move, it is highly likely the incident would never have occurred, and Jason would have returned home.”

Ensco Offshore UK Limited pleaded guilty to breaching Section 3(1) and 33(1)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. The company was fined at Aberdeen Sheriff’s Court on 18 May 2026.

Further information:

1. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is Britain’s national regulator for workplace health and safety. We are dedicated to protecting people and places, and helping everyone lead safer and healthier lives.
2. More information about the legislation referred to in this case is available.
3. Further details on the latest HSE news releases is available.
4. HSE does not pass sentences, set guidelines or collect any fines imposed. Relevant sentencing guidelines must be followed unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.  The sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences in Scotland can be found here.

• 700-tonne tank containing calcium chloride was more than 30 years old and corrosion was first identified a decade before incident.
• 62-year-old left with life-changing injuries and not been able to work since.
• Peterhead base handles thousands of ship movements each year.

A company has been fined £350,000 after the catastrophic collapse of a storage tank at its Peterhead premises which left a self-employed worker with life-changing injuries.

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) investigated the incident, which occurred on 21 June 2023 at Tetra Technologies UK Limited’s offshore supply base. The base handles around two thousand ship movements per year, supplying North Sea oil and gas installations with deck cargos and quantities of fluids.

Philip Moir, a 62-year-old self-employed rope access technician, was on site conducting surveys of storage tanks when Tank 7 — a bolted steel tank holding approximately 480,776 litres of calcium chloride solution weighing around 700 tonnes — catastrophically ruptured without warning.

Mr Moir was almost immediately immersed to chest height in the released fluid. He was subsequently found slumped over the wheel of a nearby cherry picker, which itself, along with a Ford Transit pickup, a small skip and the cherry picker — weighing twelve and a half tonnes — had all been displaced by the force of the escaping fluid.

Mr Moir sustained a double fracture of his spine and pelvis, lacerated liver, punctured lung, multiple rib fractures, fractured sternum, a fractured wrist, and extensive chemical burns requiring skin grafts. He has not worked since the incident and is unable to climb ladders or work at height, injuries described as life-changing.

HSE’s investigation, conducted by both regulatory and specialist inspectors, identified that the structural failure occurred around halfway up the tank shell, where the third row of plates split vertically along a bolted seam. Approximately 4.5mm of the original 5.5mm steel plate had been lost through corrosion over time, leaving just 1mm of steel unable to withstand the outward forces of the fluid within. Investigators found that the loss of any protective coating had left the steel surfaces exposed to aggressive coastal air, accelerating external degradation. The density of calcium chloride — more than one third denser than water — further increased the forces applied to the already weakened structure.

The tank was more than 30 years old and the manufacturer’s maintenance manual required six-monthly checks of seams and bolts, and annual external inspections for corrosion. An inspection in 2013 had already identified extensive outer surface corrosion over the lower section of the tank and corrosion at bolted connections, yet no remedial work was carried out on Tank 7. The company was unable to provide evidence of any regular inspection regime being followed in the years that followed.

On the morning of the incident, Tank 7 had been filled to capacity — a step taken to create space at the company’s Aberdeen premises — and failed less than thirty minutes after the final load was pumped in. HSE concluded that the failure of the tank was wholly foreseeable and preventable.

Following the incident, the company removed all bolted tanks from its sites and closed its Peterhead operation, relocating to its Aberdeen premises.

Tetra Technologies UK Limited of One Fleet Place, London, pleaded guilty to breaches under sections 3(1) and 33(1)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work Act etc. 1974. The company was fined £350,000 at Peterhead Sheriff Court on 13 May 2026.

HSE Inspector Mark Carroll said:

“This was a completely preventable incident.

“The corrosion that caused this tank to fail had been identified a decade before it collapsed, yet no remedial action was taken and there is no evidence that the required inspection regime was ever consistently followed.

“A worker has been left with life-changing injuries as a direct consequence of those failures.

“Companies have a legal duty to maintain equipment in an efficient state and good repair, and HSE will not hesitate to take action where that duty is not met.”

Further information.

1. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is Britain’s national regulator for workplace health and safety. We are dedicated to protecting people and places, and helping everyone lead safer and healthier lives.
2. More information about the legislation referred to in this case is available.
3. Further details on the latest HSE news releases is available.
4. HSE does not pass sentences, set guidelines or collect any fines imposed. Relevant sentencing guidelines must be followed unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.  The sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences in Scotland can be found here.

• Incident happened at Tom Nan Clach Wind Farm near Inverness.
• Worker was seriously injured following electrical flashover.
• HSE guidance is available.

A wind farm management services company has been fined £80,000 after a worker was seriously injured by an electrical flashover.

Natural Power Services Limited had sent the then 38-year-old to carry out maintenance work in an electrical substation within the Tom Nan Clach Wind Farm, near Inverness on 23^rd June 2020. His injuries resulted in him sustained life-changing injuries that have required multiple surgeries.

An investigation by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) found that the incident happened following a departure from the prepared switching programme. This meant work was allowed to be carried out on one of the two electrical cabinets while the other remained live, allowing part of the electrical system to be energised during the maintenance work.

The HSE investigation found that had the initial switching programme prepared by Natural Power Services Limited been correctly followed, the incident would not have occurred. The company did not have a suitable system or process in place to check or review switching programmes to ensure that the procedures were correctly observed at all times, or to approve any changes to the initial switching programmes.

Free guidance for employers is available on the HSE website, hse.gov.uk, about electrical safety and managing health and safety.

Natural Power Services Limited pleaded guilty to breaching Sections 3(1) and Section 33(1)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. The company was fined £80,000 at Inverness Sheriff Court on 25 November 2025.

Speaking after the hearing, an HSE spokesperson said: “This was a wholly avoidable incident caused by the failure of the company to implement a safe system of work.

“The company should have ensured there was a suitably rigorous process for checking and reviewing the work. This would have ensured those doing the work were adhering to switching programmes in a manner that was suitable and safe.

This would have been a reasonably practicable measure to address the risks arising from the subsequent introduction of additional parallel works that might interfere with the previously planned switching programme.”

Further information:

1. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is Britain’s national regulator for workplace health and safety. We are dedicated to protecting people and places, and helping everyone lead safer and healthier lives.
2. More information about the legislation referred to in this case is available.
3. Further details on the latest HSE news releases is available.
4. HSE guidance about electrical safety and managing health and safety is available.
5. HSE does not pass sentences, set guidelines or collect any fines imposed. Relevant sentencing guidelines must be followed unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.  The sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences can be found here.